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Abstract
We investigate the relations between different types of perfect equilibrium,
introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) for games with compact ac-
tion spaces and continuous payoffs. Simon and Stinchcombe distinguish
two approaches to perfect equilibrium in this context, the classical “trem-
bling hand” approach, and the so-called “finitistic” approach. We propose
an improved definition of the finitistic approach, called global-limit-of-
finite perfection, and prove its existence.
Despite the fact that the finitistic approach appeals to basic intuition,
our results—specifically examples (1) and (2)—seem to imply a severe
critique on this approach. In the first example any version of finitistic
perfect equilibrium admits a Nash equilibrium strategy profile that is not
limit admissible. The second example gives a completely mixed (and hence
trembling hand perfect) Nash equilibrium that is not finitistically perfect.
Further examples illustrate the relations between the two approaches to
perfect equilibrium and the relation to admissibility and undominatedness
of strategies.
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1 Introduction
In 1995 Simon and Stinchcombe [24], for brevity referred to as S&S in this
paper, defined perfect equilibrium for games with an infinite compact set of
actions. They distinguished two main lines of definitions of perfection. The
first line is based on the notion of a completely mixed strategy, giving rise to
the notions of strongly perfect and weakly perfect equilibrium. This approach
can be viewed as a direct generalization of the original trembling hand definition
of perfect equilibrium introduced by Selten [23]. The second line of definitions,
in S&S referred to as the finitistic approach, uses the notion of an ε-perfect
equilibrium in finite approximations of the original game. The resulting notion
of perfect equilibrium is called limit-of-finite perfect equilibrium 1. They showed
that the first type of perfect equilibrium only admits limit admissible strategies.
Furthermore, they conjectured that the two approaches are incomparable.
Perfect equilibrium in games with infinite action spaces is a useful tool to select
Nash equilibria, for example in auction models with incomplete information,
such as the ones studied in Compte and Jehiel [6] and Cre´mer et al. [7], where
dominant strategies are not available as a selection criterion. Concrete applica-
tions of perfect equilibrium in infinite strategic form games can among others
be found in Jackson et al. [11], S & S [24], and Anderson et al. [2].
In this paper we investigate the existing relations between the various types of
perfect equilibrium within the framework of strategic form games with compact
action spaces and continuous payoff functions.
The diagram below gives an overview of those relations between different types of
perfect equilibrium that are currently known. Strongly perfect, weakly perfect,
and lof (limit-of-finite) perfect equilibrium are introduced by S&S. Strongly
glof (global limit-of-finite) and weakly glof perfect equilibrium are introduced
in this paper. Limit undominated Nash equilibrium, a stronger version of limit
admissibility from S&S, is also introduced in this paper.
1Simon and Stinchcombe also introduce another variation on this type of perfection, called
anchored perfection. In this paper we hardly ever consider this variation though.
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Strongly glof
perfect NE
Weakly glof
perfect NE
Lof perfect NE
Strongly
perfect NE
Completely
mixed NE
Weakly perfect
NE
Limit
undominated
NE
Pure NE by S&S (5)
(1)
(4)
(3)
(2)(2)
Boldface arrows indicate valid implications. For example, every strongly glof
perfect equilibrium is a lof perfect equilibrium. Roman face arrows indicate
implications that do not hold in general. Counterexamples are provided by
previous studies, and examples (1) to (5) in this paper.
Related literature Equilibrium selection and refinement theory already
have a long and steady-going tradition, arguably starting with essential equi-
librium (Wu Wen-Tsu¨n and Jiang Jia-He [26]), perfect equilibrium (Selten [23])
and proper equilibrium (Myerson [20]) for finite strategic form games. Theory
on refinements for games with compact action spaces has been developed in,
among others, Me´ndez et al. [15], Simon and Stinchcombe [24], and Carbonell-
Nicolau [4]. Developments on refinements in the context of extensive form games
are for example sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson [14]) and theory on
strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens [13], Hillas [10], Mertens [16] [17], and
more recently Govindan and Wilson [9]).
The above line of literature mainly concerns what Andersson et al. [2] refer to as
“strategic uncertainty” where a player is required to play strategies that guaran-
tee robustness against possible mistakes by a player’s opponents. An alternative
line of research on equilibrium refinement is on “structural uncertainty” where,
due to informational uncertainty, iterated deletion of dominated strategies is
used as a refinement technique. This approach, also known as the global games
approach, was developed by Carlsson and van Damme [5], with applications in
for example banking and finance (Morris and Shin [19]).
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Results The paper makes two main contributions. The first contribution
is the introduction of global limit-of-finite perfection, from now on referred to
as glof perfection. S&S already introduced lof perfect equilibrium as the limit
of ε-perfect equilibria of large but finite approximations of the original game.
Despite its relative straightforward intuition, lof perfect equilibrium does not
always select available dominant strategies.
Strongly glof perfect equilibrium is defined in the same way as lof perfect equilib-
rium, but with the added requirement that best responses in the approximating
games are in fact best responses in the original game. Strongly glof perfect equi-
librium is a stronger version of finitistic perfection than lof perfect equilibrium.
Weakly glof perfect equilibrium adds to the definition of lof perfection the weak
requirement that best responses in the approximating games are only close to
best responses in the original game. We show existence of weakly glof perfect
equilibrium. Moreover, we show that weakly (and therefore also strongly) glof
perfect equilibrium does uniquely select dominant strategy Nash equilibria as
soon as dominant strategies are available to a player.
Second, we provide five illustrative counterexamples. Example 1 presents a
strongly glof perfect equilibrium that is not limit admissible. This result is
in line with Example 2.4 of S&S of a lof perfect equilibrium that is not limit
admissible. Example 2 verifies the conjecture of Simon and Stinchcombe that
strong perfection does not imply finitistic perfection. More precisely, it is an
example a completely mixed, and therefore strongly perfect, equilibrium that
is neither lof pefect (and therefore also not anchored perfect) nor weakly (and
therefore also not strongly) glof perfect. Example 3 presents a weakly glof
perfect equilibrium that is not lof perfect, and therefore also not strongly glof
perfect. Example 4 is in fact equivalent to Example 2.4 of S&S with the added
feature that the action spaces are intervals instead of the union of an interval
and an isolated point.
Example 5 is a comment on the theorem of van Damme that for bimatrix games
a Nash equilibrium is perfect precisely when the equilibrium strategies are un-
dominated. This equivalence no longer holds in the more general context of
two-player games with compact action spaces and continuous payoff functions.
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Example 5 presents a Nash equilibrium of a 2 × (∞ + 1)-bimatrix game in
undominated strategies that is not weakly perfect. An added feature of the
example is that there is another Nash equilibrium in this game that is payoff
equivalent to the first Nash equilibrium, while the second Nash equilibrium is
weakly perfect. Thus, weakly perfect equilibrium is not invariant, in contrast to
perfect equilibrium for finite strategic form games. The example highlights the
fact that for infinite compact action spaces, the topology on the action spaces
starts to matter for perfection.
Except for Example 4, all our examples use countably infinite pure action spaces.
We specifically chose not to use compact intervals as action spaces, in order to
highlight the underlying logic of the constructions. It is nevertheless evident
from the constructions that, with a bit (well, for some examples perhaps a
bit more than a bit) of extra work the examples can also be transformed to
counterexamples on the unit interval.
2 Preliminaries
For a metric space (X, d), a set U ⊆ X is open if for every x ∈ U there is an
ε > 0 such that if y ∈ X and d(x, y) < ε then y ∈ U . The topology on X
induced by metric d is the collection of all open sets we can thus construct.
For a topological space X , the Borel σ-field on X is the smallest σ-field that
contains all open sets. A probability measure on X is a function µ from a σ-field
Σ on X to [0, 1] such that µ(X) = 1, and moreover
µ(
⋃
i∈I
Ei) =
∑
i∈I
µ(Ei)
for every countable collection (Ei)i∈I of pairwise disjoint sets in Σ. For a com-
pact set X , ∆(X) denotes the set of probability measures on the Borel σ-field
on X . A probability measure µ ∈ ∆(X) is completely mixed if µ(U) > 0 for
every non-empty open subset U of X .
In this paper we use two different metrics on the space ∆(X). For a non-empty
set B ⊆ X , the distance d(x,B) between a point x ∈ X and the set B is
d(x,B) = inf{d(x, y) | y ∈ B}.
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The ε-neighborhood of B is Bε = {x ∈ X |d(x,B) < ε}. The weak metric is
defined for µ, ν ∈ ∆(X) by
ρw(µ, ν) = inf{ε | ∀B ∈ Σ : µ(B) ≤ ν(Bε) + ε and ν(B) ≤ µ(Bε) + ε}
and the strong metric by
ρs(µ, ν) = sup{|µ(B)− ν(B)| | B ∈ Σ}.
Note that for every µ and ν, ρw(µ, ν) ≤ ρs(µ, ν). This easily follows from the
observation that for every B ∈ Σ, both µ(B) − ν(Bε) and ν(B) − µ(Bε) are
smaller than or equal to |µ(B) − ν(B)| and therefore smaller than or equal to
ρs(µ, ν) as well.
The weak (strong) topology on ∆(X) is the topology induced by the weak
(strong) metric. The inequality ρw(µ, ν) ≤ ρs(µ, ν) implies that the weak topol-
ogy is included in the strong topology. Since X is compact, ∆(X) is compact
with respect to the weak metric. Further, compactness and sequential compact-
ness are equivalent for metric spaces.
3 Strategic form games
In this section we introduce the game theoretic notation used in this paper.
A strategic form game (with compact action spaces) is a triplet Γ = (N,A, u)
where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of the players, A =
∏
i∈N
Ai is the set of profiles
of actions, and u = (u1, . . . , un) is the vector of payoff functions. We assume
for every player i ∈ N that the set Ai of actions is a non-empty compact subset
of R, and that the payoff functions ui : A→ R are continuous 2.
The set ∆(Ai) is the set of (mixed) strategies of player i. We identify every
action ai with the Dirac measure δ(ai), the strategy that selects ai with prob-
ability 1. A vector σ = (σi)i∈N with σi ∈ ∆(Ai) for all i is called a strategy
profile. The set of strategy profiles is denoted 3 by ∆(A). For every strategy
2Everything we do in this paper immediately generalizes to general compact metric spaces.
In this context note that a compact metric space is automatically separable, so that the
finitistic approach also has a bite in the general case.
3With a slight abuse of notation we implicitly identify each strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈N
with its induced probability distribution in ∆(A). Obviously not every element of ∆(A) can
be obtained this way. We restrict attention to the independent elements of ∆(A) that are
induced by strategy profiles.
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profile σ ∈ ∆(A) we define ui(σ) =
∫
uidσ. Prokhorov’s Theorem implies that
ui(σ) is continuous in σ with respect to the weak metric ρ
w on ∆(A) 4.
We write A−i =
∏
j∈N\{i}
Aj . A generic element of ∆(A−i) is denoted by σ−i =
(σj)j 6=i. By (σ−i, τi) or (σ | τi) we denote the strategy profile where every player
j 6= i adheres to strategy σj , while player i uses τi. A strategy τi ∈ ∆(Ai) is
called a best response of player i to the strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(A) if ui(σ |
τi) ≥ ui(σ | ρi) for all ρi ∈ ∆(Ai). A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈N is a Nash
equilibrium if
ui(σ) ≥ ui(σ | τi)
for all i and all τi ∈ ∆(Ai). So, σ is a Nash equilibrium if each σi is a best
response to σ.
For a strategy profile σ, BRi(σ) is the set of best responses of player i to σ.
An action ai ∈ Ai is a pure best response of player i to σ if δ(ai) ∈ BRi(σ).
By PBRi(σ) we denote the set of pure best responses of player i to σ. The set
PBRi(σ) is non-empty by compactness of Ai and continuity of ui. Note that σi
is a best response to σ if and only if it puts weight 1 on pure best responses,
i.e., σi(PBRi(σ)) = 1. For a non-empty compact subset Xi of Ai,
BRi(σ | Xi) = {ρi ∈ ∆(Xi) | ui(σ | ρi) ≥ ui(σ | τi) for all τi ∈ ∆(Xi)}
is the set of player i’s best strategies against σ given that the pure choices of
player i are restricted to actions in Xi. By PBRi(σ | Xi) we denote the set of
those actions of player i that belong to BRi(σ | Xi).
4 Perfect equilibrium
Selten [23] introduced the notion of perfect equilibrium for non-cooperative ex-
tensive form games. The definition of perfect equilibrium is based on the idea
that a satisfactory interpretation of equilibrium points should accommodate
possible slight mistakes. Selten showed that perfect equilibrium exists for finite
extensive form games with perfect recall.
4Throughout the paper we use several results from real analysis without further mention.
All of the results we use are well-known. Good references for the relevant theory are for
example Aliprantis and Border [1], and Billingsley [3].
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Twenty years later Simon and Stinchcombe [24] provided a general treatment of
perfect equilibria for infinite strategic form games with compact action spaces
and continuous payoffs. S&S discuss three distinct approaches to perfect equilib-
rium for infinite normal form games. In the first two approaches, as in Selten’s
original definition, players may “tremble”, modeled by having players choose
completely mixed strategies. Players are then required to play approximate
best responses to opponents’ trembling strategies. In the strong approach, a
tremble assigns high probability to the set of pure best responses itself, while
in the weak approach a tremble is only required to assign high probability to a
neighborhood of this set. The third, limit-of-finite, approach applies traditional
refinements to sequences of successively larger finite approximations of the orig-
inal infinite game. S&S proved the existence of these three generalized notions
of perfect equilibrium. Moreover, they showed that the set of strongly perfect
equilibria is a closed, non-empty subset of the set of weakly perfect equilibria,
which is a closed subset of the collection of limit admissible Nash equilibria.
Both the strong and weak approaches of S&S use a direct generalization of the
notion of completely mixed strategies in the definition of perfect equilibrium.
Let ǫ > 0. A completely mixed strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈N in ∆(A) is a strongly
ε-perfect equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N it holds that ρs(σi, BRi(σ)) < ǫ.
It is a weakly ǫ-perfect equilibrium if ρw(σi, BRi(σ)) < ǫ.
Definition 4.1 (Simon and Stinchcombe) A strategy profile σ is a strongly
(respectively weakly) perfect equilibrium if there is a sequence (σk)∞k=1 of strongly
(weakly) 1
k
-perfect equilibria with ρw(σk, σ)→ 0 as k →∞.
In order to guarantee existence of limit points, the above definition only consid-
ers weak limits of ε-perfect equilibria. Finitistic perfection is based on a different
approach where games with infinite action spaces are approximated by games
with large, but still finite, action spaces.
Definition 4.2 (Simon and Stinchcombe) A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈N is
a limit-of-finite (lof) perfect equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N there is a
sequence (Bki )
∞
k=1 of finite subsets of Ai and a sequence (σ
k
i )
∞
k=1 of completely
mixed strategies in ∆(Bki ) such that for every i ∈ N
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[1] for every ε > 0 there is a K ∈ N such that for each k > K and for each
ai ∈ Ai there is a bi ∈ Bki with |ai − bi| < ε
[2] ρw(σki , σi)→ 0 as k →∞
[3]
∑
x∈PBRi(σk|Bki )
σki (x)→ 1 as k →∞ (where σ
k = (σki )i∈N ).
This definition has quite some appeal given our basic intuition that infinite
games often serve as a proxy for large finite games, and that therefore strategic
behavior should carry over from the finite setting to infinite games. Despite this
basic intuition, S&S already noted that even in games with dominant actions
lof perfection may fail to eliminate Nash equilibria that do not select this dom-
inant action. In order to circumvent this drawback, we propose the following
modification of lof perfection, which exclusively selects the dominant strategies
in case such strategies are available to a player.
Definition 4.3 A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈N is a strongly global-limit-
of-finite (strongly glof) perfect equilibrium if in Definition 4.2 condition 3) is
replaced by
[4] ρs(σki , BRi(σ
k))→ 0 as k→∞.
The strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈N is a weakly glof perfect equilibrium if in Defi-
nition 4.2 condition 3) is replaced by
[5] ρw(σki , BRi(σ
k))→ 0 as k →∞.
S&S introduced the method of anchoring as a–partial–remedy to the failure of
lof perfection to select limit admissible strategies. Anchoring requires us to
select a priori a collection of actions that are considered to be indispensable for
a player. Our approach is more flexible in the sense that the indispensability of
selected strategies is allowed to be contingent on the approximating sequence of
strategy profiles we consider.
Simon and Stinchcombe established existence of lof perfect equilibrium. We
show that weakly glof perfect equilibrium exists, and that every weakly glof
perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. The rather lengthy proof is deferred
to Appendix A.
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Theorem 4.4 Every strategic form game with compact action spaces has a
weakly glof perfect equilibrium. Moreover, every weakly glof perfect equilibrium
is a Nash equilibrium.
Since clearly every strongly glof perfect equilibrium is also weakly glof, both
strong and weak glof perfection refines the set of Nash equilibria. Existence of
strongly glof perfect equilibrium remains an open question.
5 Admissibility
In this section we analyze the relation between the various notions of perfection
and admissibility. We show that weak perfection exclusively selects limit undom-
inated strategies. We also show that this statement is a genuine generalization
of the classical result for finite games that perfection implies undominatedness.
For the finitistic approach the connection to admissibility is much weaker. As
said before, in Example 2.4 S&S already present a lof perfect equilibrium that
does not select the unique dominant strategy. We show that glof perfection
performs better: for every game in which a player has dominant strategies, glof
perfect equilibrium exclusively selects equilibria in which such a player plays
one of his dominant strategies. However, the analogous result for undominated
strategies again fails to hold. Example 1 presents a two-player game with a
strongly glof perfect equilibrium in which both players play dominated strategies
that are not limits of undominated strategies.
We say that τi ∈ ∆(Ai) dominates σi ∈ ∆(Ai) if
ui(σ | τi) ≥ ui(σ | σi)
for all strategy profiles σ ∈ ∆(A), and the inequality is strict for at least one
strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(A). A strategy τi is dominant if ui(σ | τi) ≥ ui(σ | σi)
for all σ ∈ ∆(A) and σi ∈ ∆(Ai). The set of all dominant strategies for player
i is denoted by Di. Obviously Di may be empty.
If there is no τi that dominates σi, we say that σi is undominated. We denote the
set of undominated strategies of player i by Ui. We write σi ∈ LUi if there exists
a sequence (σki )k∈N such that ρ
w(σki , σi)→ 0 as k→∞, and σ
k
i is undominated
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for all k 5. For ai ∈ Ai we write ai ∈ PUi, if ai is not dominated by any bi ∈ Ai.
Following S&S (1995), a strategy σi is limit admissible if σi(PUi) = 1, where
PUi denotes the closure of the set PUi.
Every limit undominated strategy is also limit admissible. The converse does
not hold though, not even for finite strategic form games. In the table below
the payoff matrix of player 2 is given:
u2 =
[
4 0 3
0 4 3
]
.
The strategy σ2 = (
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0) is limit admissible for player 2. Nevertheless, σ2 is
dominated by (0, 0, 1).
5.1 Weak perfection and admissibility
S&S already showed that weakly perfect equilibrium is limit admissible. In this
section we show the somewhat stronger claim that weakly perfect equilibrium
strategies are limit undominated. We also show that this is the exact analogue
of the classical result for finite games that perfect equilibrium strategies are
undominated.
Theorem 5.1 Let σ be a weakly perfect equilibrium. Then σi ∈ LUi for each i.
Proof. By Definition 4.1 and Theorem 3.2 of Billingsley [3], there exists
a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles σk = (σki )i∈N such that for
every i ∈ N we have ρw(σki , σi)→ 0 and ρ
w(σki , BRi(σ
k))→ 0 as k →∞.
So, for every i ∈ N , there is a sequence τki ∈ BRi(σ
k) with ρw(σki , τ
k
i ) → 0 as
k →∞. Therefore, by the triangle inequality, ρw(τki , σi)→ 0 as k →∞. Since
τki is a best response against the completely mixed profile σ
k, by Lemma B.2,
τki is undominated. Therefore σi is limit undominated.
At first glance Theorem 5.1 seems to be a compromise between the well-known
result for finite normal form games that the strategies in a perfect equilibrium
are undominated, and the transition to infinite compact action spaces. The
following Proposition shows that this compromise is only seemingly, since for
finite games limit undominated strategies are in fact undominated.
5In other words, the set LUi is the closure of the set Ui under the weak metric. The letters
LU stand for limit undominated.
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Proposition 5.2 For strategic form games with finite action spaces, the set Ui
is closed, so that Ui = LUi for such games.
Proof. To prove that the set of undominated strategies is closed, we show
that the set of dominated strategies is open. Suppose σi is dominated by τi. We
prove that there is an open set V ∋ σi such that every νi ∈ V is dominated as
well. Define ε = 12 min{σi(a) | a ∈ Ai and σi(a) > 0}. Since Ai is a finite set,
ε > 0. Define
V = {νi ∈ ∆(Ai) | ‖ νi − σi ‖∞< ε}.
Here, ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the maximum norm. Take νi ∈ V . Write µi = 2νi − σi.
We show that µi ∈ ∆(Ai). Note that if σi(a) = 0 then µi(a) ≥ 0. Now assume
that σi(a) > 0. Since ‖ νi − σi ‖∞< ε, we have
|νi(a)− σi(a)| < ε ≤
1
2
σi(a).
Consequently, µi(a) = 2νi(a) − σi(a) = 2νi(a) − 2σi(a) + σi(a) > 0. Because∑
a∈Ai
µi(a) = 1 clearly holds, we obtain µi ∈ ∆(Ai).
We show that νi =
1
2σi+
1
2µi is dominated by
1
2τi+
1
2µi. As σi is dominated by
τi, there is a strategy profile ρ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) such that ui(ρ−i, τi) > ui(ρ−i, σi).
Since ui is linear in each player’s strategy we have
ui(ρ−i,
1
2
τi +
1
2
µi) =
1
2
ui(ρ−i, τi) +
1
2
ui(ρ−i, µi)
>
1
2
ui(ρ−i, σi) +
1
2
ui(ρ−i, µi)
= ui(ρ−i,
1
2
σi +
1
2
µi).
Similarly we conclude for every σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) that
ui(σ−i,
1
2
τi +
1
2
µi) ≥ ui(σ−i,
1
2
σi +
1
2
µi).
Hence, νi =
1
2σi +
1
2µi is dominated by
1
2τi +
1
2µi.
5.2 Finitistic perfection and admissibility
The relation between finitistic perfection and admissibility is much weaker than
it is for weakly perfect equilibrium. S&S already have an example of a game in
which one of the players has a unique dominant action (see example 2.4 of Simon
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and Stinchcombe [24]), while nevertheless there is a lof perfect equilibrium in
this game in which the player in question does play a dominated action. Hence,
even in games with dominant actions, lof perfection does not exclusively select
limit admissible strategies.
We show that our alternative definition of finitistic perfection, glof perfect equi-
librium, does select only dominant strategies in case such strategies are available
to a player. In an example we show that for games without dominant strategies
also glof perfect equilibrium may use strategies that are not limit admissible.
Write PDi := {ai ∈ Ai | δ(ai) ∈ Di}. In Appendix B we show that Di is closed
with respect to the weak metric in ∆(Ai), that PDi is closed in Ai, and that
Di = ∆(PDi).
Theorem 5.3 Let σ ∈ ∆(A) be a weakly glof equilibrium. Suppose that Di is
not empty. Then σi ∈ Di.
Proof. Because σ is a weakly glof equilibrium, for every player i there is a
sequence (σki )
∞
k=1 such that ρ
w(σki , σi)→ 0 and ρ
w(σki , BRi(σ
k))→ 0 as k →∞.
So, for every k we can take τki ∈ BRi(σ
k) such that ρw(σki , τ
k
i )→ 0 as k →∞.
Then, by the triangle inequality for ρw, also ρw(σi, τ
k
i )→ 0 as k →∞.
Suppose that Di is not empty. Then, by Proposition B.4, PDi is not empty
either. Let U ⊃ PDi be open. First we show that τki (U) = 1 for sufficiently
large k. When U = Ai, this is evident. Suppose U 6= Ai. Take ai ∈ Ai \ U and
bi ∈ PDi. By Lemma B.1, there is an a−i ∈ A−i such that
ui(bi, a−i) > ui(ai, a−i).
Since ui is continuous, there are open sets V (ai) ∋ ai and W (a−i) ∋ a−i such
that for every xi ∈ V (ai) and x−i ∈W (a−i) we have
ui(bi, x−i) > ui(xi, x−i).
Take xi ∈ V (ai). Since bi is a dominant strategy, we have
ui(bi, y−i) ≥ ui(xi, y−i)
for every y−i ∈ A−i. Further, define Bk−i =
∏
j 6=i
Bkj . Then B
k
−i ∩W (a−i) 6= ∅
for large k by Definition 4.3. So, since σk−i is a completely mixed strategy in
Perfect equilibrium and compact action spaces 13
∆(Bk−i), we know that
ui(bi, σ
k
−i) > ui(xi, σ
k
−i)
for large k. Hence, for large k, xi is not a best response to σ
k. We conclude for
every ai ∈ Ai \ U that
V (ai) ∩ PBRi(σ
k) = ∅
for large k. Now note that Ai \ U is compact, since it is a closed subset of a
compact set. Therefore, there are actions a1i , . . . , a
p
i in Ai \ U such that Ai \ U
is a subset of
p⋃
r=1
V (ari ). Moreover,
PBRi(σ
k) ∩
p⋃
j=1
V (aji ) = ∅
for large k. Consequently PBRi(σ
k) ⊆ U for large k. But τki ∈ BRi(σ
k), so
that τki (PBRi(σ
k)) = 1 for all k. Hence, τki (U) = 1 for large k, as claimed.
We show that σi ∈ Di. Take ε > 0. Since ρw(σi, τki )→ 0 as k →∞,
τki (U)− ε ≤ σi(U
ε)
for large k. Because τki (U) = 1 for large k, we get 1 − ε ≤ σi(U
ε). Since ε > 0
and U ⊇ PDi were chosen arbitrarily, and since PDi is a closed set, we can
conclude that σi(PDi) = 1. Hence, σi ∈ ∆(PDi) = Di.
Theorem 5.3 shows that in games where players have dominant strategies, weak
glof perfection can only select those equilibria in which dominant strategies are
played. However, the next example shows that, in games where players do not
have dominant strategies, even strong glof perfection may fail to uniquely select
limit admissible strategies.
EXAMPLE 1. The action spaces are
A1 = A2 = {−∞, . . . ,−3,−2,−1, 1, 2, 3, . . . ,∞},
in which each integer is an isolated point, whereas −∞ is the limit of the se-
quence −1,−2, ... and ∞ is the limit of the sequence 1, 2, . . .. The topological
structure is shown in the picture below.
−∞ ∞−1 1−2 2−3 3
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The payoff functions u1 and u2 are symmetric and u1 is given in the table below.
Player 1 is the row player, and player 2 is the column player.
u1 −∞ . . . -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 . . . ∞
−∞ 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
... . .
. ...
-3 0 . . . 13 0 0 0 0
1
3 . . . 0
-2 0 . . . 0 12 0 0
1
2 0 . . . 0
-1 0 . . . 0 0 1 1 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 . . . 0 0 0 1 0 0 . . . 0
2 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 12 0 . . . 0
3 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 13 . . . 0
...
... . .
. ...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
∞ 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
Claim. The action pair (∞,∞) is a strongly glof perfect equilibrium. However,
∞ is not limit admissible for either player.
Proof. For either player, ∞ is not limit admissible because ∞ is dominated
by every action k ∈ Z, and every action k ∈ N is dominated by action −k.
Now, we prove that σ = (∞,∞) is a strongly glof perfect equilibrium. For every
player i = 1, 2 and k ∈ N, let Bki = {−k, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , k + 1} and let σ
k
i be
the completely mixed strategy on Bki which assigns probability
1
(k+2)2 to every
action in Bki except action k + 1 and assigns probability (1−
2k
(k+2)2 ) to action
k+1. It is clear that (Bki )
∞
k=1 satisfies the first condition of Definition 4.3. Since
ρw(σki , σi) → 0 for i = 1, 2 as k → ∞, the second condition also holds. Using
the payoff table, one can verify that strategies (−k− 1) and (k+1) are the best
responses for player 1 against σk2 in A1. Due to symmetry, the same holds for
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player 2. Thus,
ρs(σki , BRi(σ
k)) = 1− (1−
2k
(k + 2)2
) =
2k
(k + 2)2
,
which tends to zero as k → ∞. Hence, condition 4 of Definition 4.3 is valid as
well, and σ is a strongly glof perfect equilibrium.
6 Relations between definitions of perfect equi-
librium
Simon and Stinchcombe [24] conjectured (on page 1433) that there are strongly
perfect equilibria that are not anchored perfect. We provide a concrete example
of a completely mixed, and therefore surely strongly perfect, equilibrium that
is neither lof perfect nor glof perfect (and therefore also not anchored perfect).
Thus, the finitistic approach to perfection does not have a straightforward logical
relation to the trembling hand approach.
EXAMPLE 2. The action spaces are A1 = A2 = {1, 2, 3, . . . ,∞,∞+ 1}, where
all natural numbers and ∞ + 1 are isolated points, whereas ∞ is the limit of
the sequence 1, 2, . . . The topology is shown in the picture below:
∞1 2 3 4 ∞ + 1
The payoff functions u1 and u2 are symmetric and u1 is given in the table below.
u1 1 2 3 4 . . . ∞ ∞+ 1
1 482
−1
8 0 0 . . . 0 0
2 4162 0
−1
16 0 . . . 0 0
3 4322 0 0
−1
32 . . . 0 0
4 4642 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
∞ 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
∞+ 1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
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Define the strategies σ1 and σ2 by
σ1 = σ2 =
1
4
· δ(1) +
1
8
· δ(2) +
1
16
· δ(3) + . . .+
1
4
· δ(∞) +
1
4
· δ(∞+ 1).
Claim. The strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is a completely mixed, and hence strongly
perfect equilibrium. However, it is neither lof perfect nor weakly glof perfect.
This verifies the conjecture of S&S [24] 6.
Proof. It is clear that (σ1, σ2) is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium. Hence,
it is a strongly perfect equilibrium.
We show that the completely mixed equilibrium is not lof perfect. Suppose
by way of contradiction that (σ1, σ2) is lof perfect. For every player i, take a
sequence (Bki )
∞
k=1 of finite subsets of Ai and a sequence of strategies (σ
k
i )
∞
k=1
that satisfy the conditions in Definition 4.2. Let mk and nk be the largest
positive integers in the sets Bk1 and B
k
2 , respectively. Since ∞+1 is an isolated
point of the action sets, for large k each Bki includes ∞+1. Moreover, for large
k, ∞ + 1 must be a best response for player 1 against σk2 among B
k
1 , because
σ1 places positive probability on ∞+ 1. As strategy ∞+ 1 has payoff zero for
player 1, for large k player 1 cannot have an action in Bk1 which gives him a
positive payoff against σk2 . Since player 1 would get a positive payoff for every
action m ≥ nk, we have mk < nk. Then also nk < mk by symmetry, which is
a contradiction. By similar arguments the completely mixed equilibrium is not
weakly glof either.
We continue with a discussion of the relations between the different approaches
to finitistic perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 6.1 Every strongly glof perfect equilibrium is lof perfect.
Proof. Suppose that σ = (σi)i∈N is a strongly glof perfect equilibrium. Then,
for every i ∈ N , there is a sequence (Bki )
∞
k=1 of finite subsets of Ai and a
sequence of strategies (σki )
∞
k=1 that satisfy the conditions in Definition 4.3. We
show that they also satisfy condition 3 of Definition 4.2. Since for every i, we
have ρs(σki , BRi(σ
k)) → 0 as k → ∞, there exists a sequence (µki )
∞
k=1 such
that µki ∈ BRi(σ
k) for every k ∈ N and ρs(σki , µ
k
i ) → 0 as k → ∞. As ui is
6Their conjecture only concerns anchored perfect equilibrium. We show the stronger claim
that the completely mixed equilibrium is even not a lof perfect equilibrium.
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a continuous function, PBRi(σ
k) is a closed, hence Borel, subset of the action
space Ai. Moreover, since best responses put weight 1 on pure best responses,
ρs(σki , µ
k
i ) ≥
∣∣∣σki (PBRi(σk))− µki (PBRi(σk))
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣σki (PBRi(σk))− 1
∣∣∣
for every i and k. So, σki (PBRi(σ
k)) → 1 as k → ∞. This implies that for
large k, player i has a pure best response to σk which lies in Bki . Consequently,
σki (PBRi(σ
k | Bki ))→ 1 as k →∞, and σ is a lof perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 5.3 shows that the lof perfect equilibrium in Example 2.4 in S&S is
not weakly glof perfect (and hence not strongly glof perfect either). Next we
present an example of a weakly glof perfect equilibrium that is not lof perfect.
Consequently, lof perfection and weak glof perfection are not comparable.
EXAMPLE 3. In this game the action spaces are
A1 = A2 = {−1,−2,−3, . . . , 0, . . . , 3, 2, 1},
where all integers except 0 are isolated points, whereas 0 is the limit point of
the sequences −1,−2, . . . and 1, 2, . . . The topological structure is shown in the
picture below.
0−1 −2 −3 123
The topology can be metrized by the following metric. For every k, l ∈ Ai,
d(k, l) =


0 if k = l = 0
|1
l
| if k = 0 and l 6= 0
| 1
k
| if k 6= 0 and l = 0
| 1
k
− 1
l
| if k 6= 0 and l 6= 0.
The payoff functions u1 and u2 are symmetric and u1 is given in the table below.
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u1 -1 -2 -3 · · · 0 · · · +3 +2 +1
-1 1 12
1
3 · · · 0 · · · 0 0 1
-2 0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 12 0
-3 0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 13 0 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
... . .
. ...
...
...
0 0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 0 0
...
...
...
... . .
. ...
. . .
...
...
...
+3 0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 0 0
+2 0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 0 0
+1 0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 0 0
Claim. The Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) = (0, 0) is weakly glof perfect. How-
ever, (σ1, σ2) is not lof perfect, and therefore by Proposition 6.1 not strongly
glof perfect either.
Proof. We show that (σ1, σ2) is a weakly glof perfect. For every k ∈ N, define
εk =
1
k(k+3) . Moreover, for k ∈ N and i = 1, 2, write
Bki = {−1,−2, . . . ,−k}
⋃
{k, . . . , 2, 1}.
Let σki be the completely mixed strategy on B
k
i that assigns probability εk to
every action in Bki except action k, to which it assigns probability 1−(2k−1)εk.
Note that due to the choice of εk, we have 1 − (2k − 1)εk > εk > 0. It is clear
that conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 4.3 are satisfied. It remains to verify that
condition 5 holds as well. According to the payoff table, player 1’s pure best
response to σk2 is either −1 or −k. Since for every k ≥ 2 we have
u1(δ(−1), σ
k
2 ) = εk(1 +
1
2
+
1
3
+ . . .+
1
k
+ 1)
≤ εk(k + 1)
< (1− (2k − 1)εk)
1
k
= u1(δ(−k), σ
k
2 ),
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player 1’s unique best response against σk2 is −k. We prove that
ρw(σk1 , BR1(σ
k)) = ρw(σk1 , δ(−k)) ≤
2
k
.
Let ε > 2
k
= d(−k, k). It is easy to see that (2k − 1)εk ≤ ε. Take an arbitrary
set B ⊆ A1.
A. We show that δ(−k)(B) ≤ σk1 (B
ε) + ε. If −k /∈ B. Then
δ(−k)(B) = 0 ≤ σk1 (B
ε) + ε.
If −k ∈ B. Then k ∈ Bε. So
δ(−k)(B) = 1 ≤ (1− (2k − 1)εk) + ε = σ
k
1 (k) + ε ≤ σ
k
1 (B
ε) + ε.
B. We show that σk1 (B) ≤ δ(−k)(B
ε) + ε. If −k ∈ B. Then
σk1 (B) ≤ 1 < 1 + ε = δ(−k)(B
ε) + ε
If −k /∈ B and k /∈ B. Then
σk1 (B) ≤ (2k − 1)εk ≤ ε ≤ δ(−k)(B
ε) + ε.
If −k /∈ B and k ∈ B. Then −k ∈ Bε. So
σk1 (B) ≤ 1 + ε = δ(−k)(B
ε) + ε.
So, by A, B, and the choice of ε, ρw(σk1 , δ(−k)) ≤
2
k
. Since the payoff functions
are symmetric this argument is also valid for the second player. Therefore,
condition 5 of Definition 4.3 holds and σ is a weakly glof perfect equilibrium as
claimed.
We show that (0, 0) is not lof perfect. Suppose the opposite. Then by Definition
4.2 for each i = 1, 2 there is non-empty finite subset Bi of Ai and a completely
mixed strategy σi in ∆(Bi) such that
σi (PBRi(σ | Bi)) ≥
2
3
,
where σ = (σ1, σ2). Since −1 is an isolated point, w.l.o.g. −1 ∈ Bi for each
i = 1, 2. Furthermore, PBRi(σ | Bi) is a subset of {−1,−2, . . .}. Define
Mi = −min {x | x ∈ PBRi(σ | Bi)} for i = 1, 2.
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Assume w.l.o.g. that M1 ≥ M2. Because −M1 ∈ PBR1(σ | B1) and −1 ∈ B1
we have
u1(δ(−1), σ2) ≤ u1(δ(−M1), σ2).
Thus, according to the payoff table,
2
3
·
1
M2
≤ u1(δ(−1), σ2) ≤ u1(δ(−M1), σ2) ≤
1
3
·
1
M1
.
Rewriting yields M22 ≥M1. Consequently
M2
2 ≥M2. Contradiction.
Finally, in this section we present a modification of the example in S&S of a
pure equilibrium that is limit of finite, while one of the players plays an action
that is not limit admissible. Theorem 5.3 shows that the equilibrium is not
weakly glof.
EXAMPLE 4 The game has two players with action spaces A1 = A2 = [0, 1]
and utility functions u1 = 0 and
u2(a1, a2) =
{
(a2 − 1) · a1 if a1 ≤ a2
(a2 + 1) · a1 − 2a2 if a1 ≥ a2.
In the following picture the function a1 7→ u2(a1, a2) is depicted for a fixed
action a2 of player 2.
-
a1
6
a2
1
PPPPPPP





a2(a2 − 1)
1− a2
`
`
u2
0
Claim. The action pair (0, 1) is a lof perfect equilibrium. However, a2 = 0 is the
unique dominant strategy, so that a2 = 1 is not limit admissible. Consequently,
the equilibrium is not weakly glof perfect.
Proof. The strategy a2 = 0 is the unique dominant strategy for player 2, so
that a2 = 1 is not limit admissible. Hence, by Theorem 5.3, the pair (0, 1) is
not weakly glof perfect.
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In order to show that (0, 1) is lof perfect, take ε ∈ (0, 1). For n ∈ N, consider
the finite subsets
Bn1 =
{
i
n
| i = 0, 1, . . . , n
}
and Bn2 =
{
i
n
| i = 1, . . . , n
}
of A1 and A2, respectively. For 0 < s <
ε
1+n2 , define the strategy
τ1(ε, s) = (1− ε)δ(0) + (ε− s)δ(
1
n
) +
s
n− 1
n∑
i=2
δ(
i
n
).
Then for every aj2 =
j
n
, j = 1, . . . , n− 1 we have
u2
(
τ1(ε, s), δ(a
j
2)
)
= (ε− s) · u2(
1
n
, j
n
) + s
n−1 ·
[
n∑
i=2
u2(
i
n
, j
n
)
]
≤ (ε− s) · u2(
1
n
, j
n
) + s
n−1 ·
[
n∑
i=2
1
]
≤ (ε− s) ·
(
1
n
)
· ( j
n
− 1) + s
≤ (ε− s)
(
1
n
)
(− 1
n
) + s
= s · 1+n
2
n2
− ε
n2
< 0.
This outcome is less than zero, but player 2 can get zero by choosing an2 = 1 in
the set Bn2 . Hence, action pair (0, 1) is a lof perfect equilibrium.
7 Two players
For finite strategic form games it is well-known that perfection implies undom-
inatedness. A similarly well-known theorem of van Damme (see for example
van Damme [8], Theorem 3.2.2) states that for bimatrix games the converse
implication also holds.
Theorem 7.1 Let (p, q) be a strategy pair of the bimatrix game (A,B). Equiv-
alent are
[1] The strategy pair (p, q) is a perfect equilibrium.
[2] The strategy pair (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium and both p and q are undom-
inated strategies.
Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 5.2 show that, in the appropriately adjusted sense,
the implication from (1) to (2) is also valid in the setting with infinite compact
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action spaces. A natural guess would be that the appropriately adjusted con-
verse would also be true for two-player infinite games. However, the following
example shows that the converse implication from (2) to (1) no longer holds
for games with infinite action spaces. (In their Example 2 Me´ndez et al. [15]
address the same issue in a game with interval action spaces.)
EXAMPLE 5. The action spaces are A1 = {T,B} and A2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . ,∞},
where all natural numbers are isolated points, whereas ∞ is the limit point of
the sequence 1, 2, 3, . . . The payoffs for the players are given by
u1 =

0 0 0 . . . 0
1 1 1 . . . 1

 and u2 =

0
1
2
1
3
1
4 . . . . . . 0
0 − 14 −
1
9 −
1
16 . . . . . . 0


Claim. The action pair (B, 1) is a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies,
yet (B, 1) is not a weakly perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Clearly (B, 1) is a Nash equilibrium and actions B and 1 are undomi-
nated in A1 and A2 respectively.
We prove that the action pair σ = (B, 1) is not a weakly perfect equilibrium.
Take any completely mixed strategy τ1 = (p, 1− p) of player 1. Take a natural
number k > 1−p
p
. Then 1−p
k
< p, so that
u2 (τ1, δ(k)) = p ·
1
k
− (1− p) ·
1
k2
=
1
k
·
[
p−
1− p
k
]
> 0.
Since u2(τ1, δ(1)) = 0, this implies that δ(1) is not a best response for player 2
against any completely mixed strategy of player 1. Hence, σ = (B, 1) is not a
weakly perfect equilibrium.
Note that the above example is in a very strong sense minimal. The action
space A2 is in a very natural way the “smallest” example of a compact set that
is not finite. And also A1 is minimal in the sense that it is the smallest example
of an action space in which player 1 actually has a genuine choice to make.
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8 Invariance
Another remarkable feature of the game in Example 5 is that (B,∞) is a strongly
(and hence also weakly) perfect equilibrium. This is surprising in the sense that
∞ is payoff equivalent to 1 for player 2. Thus, both strong and weak perfection
violate invariance in this setting, while perfect equilibrium satisfies invariance
in the setting of finite strategic form games (see for example Mertens [18] and
Vermeulen and Jansen [25]).
The underlying cause of this seeming breakdown of invariance is that in the
finite case the space of actions is, from a topological perspective, a very simple
object. All actions are isolated points, and hence there is a homeomorphism
that transforms one into the other while the induced transformation on payoffs
equals the identity in the case of payoff equivalence.
However, in the infinite case two actions giving the same payoff might be totally
different from a topological perspective. Therefore, only conditional on having
a homeomorphism that preserves payoffs, we can conclude that strong and weak
perfection are invariant too. This result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 8.1 Both strongly and weakly perfect equilibrium are invariant under
payoff preserving homeomorphic transformations of the action spaces.
Note that, for finite games, invariance with respect to payoff preserving home-
omorphic transformations is in fact equivalent to invariance. Hence, the above
Theorem implies that for finite strategic form games perfect equilibrium is in-
variant.
9 Discussion
We studied the relations between various generalizations of the basic notion of
perfect equilibrium to the context of strategic form games with compact action
spaces and continuous payoff functions. We showed the existence of weakly
glof perfect equilibrium, and presented several examples of games with compact
action spaces that clarify the relationships between admissibility, trembling hand
perfect equilibrium, and finitistic perfect equilibrium.
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Specifically, we showed in Example 5 that the equivalence between perfection
and undominatedness for bimatrix games no longer holds for general two-person
strategic form games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs.
We also verified a conjecture of Simon and Stichcombe [24] with an example of
a completely mixed Nash equilibrium that is not perfect in any of the finitistic
definitions. Despite its appeal to basic intuition of the finitistic approach, our
results (especially Examples 1 and 2) seem to imply a severe critique on the
finitistic approach. Example 1 shows that finitistic perfection may easily fail to
be limit admissible, a fact that was already observed by Simon and Stinchcombe
for lof perfection. Example 2 shows that a completely mixed equilibrium need
not be perfect in any of the finitistic approaches.
In Example 2 the completely mixed equilibrium is part of a component of Nash
equilibria, one of which is still finitistically perfect. It remains an open question
whether an isolated completely mixed equilibrium is automatically perfect in
the finitistic approach. Another possible question for future research is the
existence of strongly glof perfect equilibrium.
A Proof of Theorem 4.4
The proof of Theorem 4.4 is based on the fixed point Theorem of Kakutani. We
state the Theorem of Kakutani first.
Let X and Y be two metric spaces. A correspondence between X and Y is a
map from the elements of X to the collection of all subsets of Y . So, for every
x ∈ X , we have F (x) ⊆ Y . A correspondence F between X and Y is upper-
hemicontinuous if for every x ∈ X and every sequence (xn)∞n=1 in X converging
to x and every sequence (yn)
∞
n=1 in Y converging to y with yn ∈ F (xn) it holds
that y ∈ F (x). A point x ∈ X is called a fixed point for a correspondence
F : X ։ X when x ∈ F (x).
Theorem A.1 (Kakutani’s fixed point theorem) Let X be a non-empty, com-
pact and convex subset of an Euclidean space. Let F : X ։ X be an upper-
hemicontinuous correspondence such that F (x) is non-empty, closed and convex
for all x ∈ X. Then F has a fixed point.
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We show Theorem 4.4. W.l.o.g. suppose that Ai ⊆ [0, 1] for every i ∈ N . Fix
k ∈ N. For every i, construct a finite subset Bki of Ai with |B
k
i | ≤ 3k and for
every a ∈ Ai there is a b ∈ Bki such that |a − b| ≤
1
k
. Write nik = |Bki | and
ε = 13k2 . For every i, define
∆ki (ε) =
{
νi ∈ ∆(B
k
i ) | νi(b) ≥ ε for every b ∈ B
k
i
}
and ∆k(ε) =
∏
i∈N
∆ki (ε). Define the correspondence ABR
k
i : ∆
k(ε)։ ∆ki (ε) by
ABRki (σ) =
{
µi ∈ ∆
k
i (ǫ) | ρ
w(µi, BRi(σ)) ≤
2
k
}
for every σ = (σi)i∈N ∈ ∆k(ε) 7. Furthermore, define the correspondence
ABRk : ∆k(ε)։ ∆k(ε) by, for every σ ∈ ∆(A),
ABRk(σ) =
∏
i∈N
ABRki (σ).
We verify the conditions of Theorem A.1.
A. Clearly ∆k(ε) is compact and convex. Further, since ε = 13k2 and |B
k
i | ≤
3k, the set ∆k(ε) is not empty.
B. We verify that ABRk(σ) satisfies the conditions of the Theorem of Kaku-
tani.
B1. We show for every i ∈ N thatABRki (σ) is non-empty. Take a ∈ PBRi(σ).
Then, there is a b ∈ Bki such that |a− b| ≤
1
k
. Hence, ρw(δ(a), δ(b)) ≤ 1
k
. Now,
for x ∈ Bki define
µi(x) =
{
ε if x 6= b
1− (nik − 1)ǫ if x = b.
Then, µi ∈ ∆ki (ε). Moreover,
ρw(µi, δ(b)) ≤ ‖µi − δ(b)‖∞ = (nik − 1)ε ≤ 3k ·
1
3k2
=
1
k
.
Then, by the triangle inequality we have
ρw(µi, δ(a)) ≤
1
k
+
1
k
=
2
k
.
Thus, ρw(µi, BRi(σ)) ≤
2
k
, which implies µi ∈ ABRki (σ). Hence, ABR
k(σ) is
non-empty.
7ABR stands for approximate best response.
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B2. Clearly, for every i, ABRki (σ) is closed and therefore ABR
k(σ) is closed
as well.
B3. We prove that ABRki (σ) is convex for every i. Take strategies µ, ν ∈
ABRki (σ). We prove that cµ + (1 − c)ν ∈ ABR
k
i (σ) for every c ∈ [0, 1]. Since
µ, ν ∈ ABRki (σ), we have ρ
w(µ,BRi(σ)) ≤
2
k
and ρw(ν,BRi(σ)) ≤
2
k
. So there
are strategies µ′, ν′ ∈ BRi(σ) such that
ρw(µ, µ′) ≤
2
k
and ρw(ν, ν′) ≤
2
k
.
Take an arbitrary δ > 2
k
. Then, for every non-empty measurable set A ⊆ Ai,
we have
µ(A) ≤ µ′(Aδ) + δ
µ′(A) ≤ µ(Aδ) + δ
and
ν(A) ≤ ν′(Aδ) + δ
ν′(A) ≤ ν(Aδ) + δ.
Then,
cµ(A) + (1− c)ν(A) ≤ cµ′(Aδ) + (1− c)ν′(Aδ) + δ
cµ′(A) + (1− c)ν′(A) ≤ cµ(Aδ) + (1− c)ν(Aδ) + δ.
Hence,
ρw (cµ+ (1− c)ν, cµ′ + (1− c)ν′) ≤ δ,
which by the choice of δ implies
ρw (cµ+ (1− c)ν, cµ′ + (1− c)ν′) ≤
2
k
.
Since BRi(σ) is a convex set, cµ
′ + (1 − c)ν′ ∈ BRi(σ). Thus,
ρw(cµ+ (1− c)ν,BRi(σ)) ≤
2
k
,
which implies cµ+ (1− c)ν ∈ ABRki (σ).
C. We show that ABRk is upper-hemicontinuous. Take sequences (σm)∞m=1
and (τm)∞m=1 in ∆
k(ǫ) such that lim
m→∞
σm = σ and lim
m→∞
τm = τ in Euclidean
distance, and such that τm ∈ ABRk(σm) for every m ∈ N. We show τi ∈
ABRki (σ) for every i ∈ N , so that τ ∈ ABR
k(σ).
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Take m ∈ N. Since τmi ∈ ABR
k
i (σ
m), we have ρw(τmi , BRi(σ
m)) ≤ 2
k
. As
BRi(σ
m) is a closed set with respect to the weak metric, there is a strategy
µmi ∈ BRi(σ
m) such that ρw(τmi , µ
m
i ) ≤
2
k
. Because ∆(Ai) is sequentially com-
pact with respect to the weak metric, the sequence (µmi )
∞
m=1 has a subsequence
(µmℓi )
∞
ℓ=1 with ρ
w(µmℓi , µi)→ 0 as l→∞ for some µi ∈ ∆(Ai). Then, by conti-
nuity of ui with respect to ρ
w, we have µi ∈ BRi(σ). Moreover, ρ
w(τi, µi) ≤
2
k
.
Hence, ρw(τi, BRi(σ)) ≤
2
k
. This shows that the correspondenceABRk is upper-
hemicontinuous. This concludes C.
By A, B, and C we know that each ABRk satisfies the conditions of Theorem
A.1. Hence, for every k, there is a σk ∈ ∆k(ε) such that σk ∈ ABRk(σk), which
means that σki ∈ ABR
k
i (σ
k) for every i. Hence, ρw(σki , BRi(σ
k)) ≤ 2
k
for every
i. Since ∆(A) is sequentially compact with respect to the weak metric, we can
assume w.l.o.g. that the sequence σk = (σki )i∈N converges to a strategy profile
σ = (σi)i∈N when k → ∞. Note that ρw(σki , BRi(σ
k)) → 0 as k → ∞. Hence,
σ = (σi)i∈N is a weakly glof perfect equilibrium.
It remains to show that every weakly glof perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilib-
rium. Suppose that σ = (σi)i∈N is a weakly glof perfect equilibrium. Then, by
definition, for every i there is a sequence (σki )
∞
k=1 such that ρ
w(σki , σi)→ 0 and
ρw(σki , BRi(σ
k))→ 0 as k →∞. Therefore, for every i there is also a sequence
(µki )
∞
k=1 such that µ
k
i ∈ BRi(σ
k) for every k ∈ N and ρw(σki , µ
k
i )→ 0 as k →∞.
By the triangle inequality for ρw, this implies that for every i, ρw(µki , σi) → 0
as k → ∞. Hence, again by continuity of ui, we obtain σi ∈ BRi(σ) for every
i ∈ N , as desired.
B Proofs for Section 5
Lemma B.1 Suppose that τi dominates σi. Then there is an a−i ∈ A−i such
that ui(a−i, τi) > ui(a−i, σi).
Proof. Suppose that ui(a−i, τi) = ui(a−i, σi) for every a−i ∈ A−i. Then, for
every σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) we have ui(σ−i, τi) = ui(σ−i, σi). Contradiction.
Lemma B.2 Suppose that strategy τi ∈ ∆(Ai) dominates σi ∈ ∆(Ai). Then
ui(σ | τi) > ui(σ | σi)
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for any completely mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(A). Consequently, any best
response to a completely mixed strategy profile is undominated.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma B.1 and the continuity of the
payoff function ui on ∆(A).
The next Theorem is a direct consequence of the monotonicity of measure.
Lemma B.3 Suppose that f is a real function on X which is strictly positive
and µ is a measure on X such that µ(X) > 0. Then,
∫
X
fdµ > 0.
Proof. Let Fn = {x ∈ X | f(x) ≥
1
n
}. It is clear that F1 ⊆ F2 ⊆ F3 ⊆ · · · and
∞⋃
n=1
Fn = X . Consequently, µ(Fn) ↑ µ(X) when n→∞. Since µ(X) > 0, there
exists an n ∈ N such that µ(Fn) > 0 . But for every x ∈ X , f(x) ≥
1
n
1Fn(x).
Therefore, ∫
X
fdµ ≥
1
n
∫
X
1Fndµ =
1
n
µ(Fn).
Thus,
∫
X
fdµ > 0, as claimed.
Proposition B.4 The set Di is closed with respect to the weak metric in ∆(Ai)
and PDi is closed in Ai. Moreover, Di = ∆(PDi).
Proof. Assume that Di is non-empty, otherwise the statements are obvious.
Take a ρi ∈ Di. For every σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) define
Fσ−i = {σi ∈ ∆(Ai) | ui(σ−i, σi) = ui(σ−i, ρi)} .
Since ui is a continuous function on ∆(Ai) with respect to the weak metric,
Fσ−i is a closed set. Moreover, Di =
⋂
σ−i∈∆(A−i)
Fσ−i . Therefore, Di is also a
closed set with respect to the weak metric. With a similar argument we can
conclude that PDi is a closed subset of Ai.
Now we show that Di = ∆(PDi). Since ∆(PDi) ⊆ Di, we only need to prove
that ρi ∈ Di implies ρi ∈ ∆(PDi), or equivalently ρi(PDi) = 1. Suppose by
way of contradiction that ρi(PDi) < 1, implying ρi(Ai \ PDi) > 0. Take a
completely mixed strategy profile τ ∈ ∆(A). Let c = ui(τ | ρi). By Lemma B.2
we have
ui(τ | xi) < ui(τ | ρi) = c
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for every xi ∈ Ai \ PDi, while ui(τ | xi) = ui(τ | ρi) = c for every xi ∈ PDi.
Then, using Lemma B.3 to get the strict inequality, we have
c = ui(τ | ρi) =
∫
Ai
ui(τ | xi) dρi
=
∫
PDi
ui(τ | xi) dρi +
∫
Ai\PDi
ui(τ | xi) dρi
< c ρi(PDi) + c ρi(Ai\PDi) = c
which is a contradiction.
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